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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence of a more favorable tax treat-
ment for foreign multinationals compared to similar domestic ¯rms in a
small open economy. Using treatment e®ects to control for self-selection
of foreign ¯rms into low tax ¯rms, we ¯nd that foreign multinationals
have substantially lower e®ective tax rates compared to domestic ¯rms.
In our estimations we also control for ¯rm size, sector membership and
business-cycle e®ects. A simple theoretical framework is used to explain
our empirical ¯ndings and rests on the notion that multinational ¯rms
are in a better position to bargain for lower taxes with governments as a
result of their "footloose" nature and outside location options.
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11 Introduction and problem de¯nition
Corporate tax policy is one of the few remaining instruments that European
countries have at their disposal in order to attract foreign investment. This
is only one of the reasons why in recent years tax competition in Europe has
intensi¯ed and o±cial tax rates have been falling over time. In this paper we
analyze to what extent a small open economy like Belgium tax discriminates
between foreign owned multinationals (MNEs) and domestically owned ¯rms.
There are several reasons why the tax treatment of MNEs may di®er from those
of domestic ¯rms.
Firstly, multinational ¯rms are increasingly footloose and at the same time in-
creasingly important in an economy. At the end of 1997 the added value of all
multinational ¯rms (MNE) in the world was approximately a quarter of the to-
tal added value in the world (Kind et al., 2001). In 2002, the stock represented
foreign investments were on average 22% of the GNP of each country and the
corresponding percentages for West European countries were still higher, be-
tween 31.4% and 42.7% (United Nations, 2003). The theoretical taxation liter-
ature suggests that governments indeed tend to favor mobile production factors
(Hau°er and Wooton, 1999, 2001).
Secondly, as Gresik (2001) points out, MNEs are °exible in terms of geographi-
cally organizing their production structure. This °exibility allows them to opti-
mize their activities as a function of the tax policies in di®erent countries which
puts them in a better bargaining position vis-µ a-vis national tax authorities to
obtain special treatment or tax rulings than purely domestic ¯rms. Also, MNEs
are usually more productive than domestic ¯rms as documented by Gri±th
(1999). This productivity edge can have a positive in°uence on the technology
of local companies and subcontractors and create positive spillovers (Javorcik,
2004).
Thirdly, the relationship between corporate taxation and the location of MNEs
is an important issue on the political agenda of both the European Union and
the OECD. As stated recently by the Commission of the European Union: "Now
that a lot of internal trade barriers have been eliminated among the EU Member
States and the internal markets for goods, labor and capital are more integrated,
the allocation of capital (economic activity and investments) becomes more and
more sensitive to di®erences in corporate taxation." The recent accession of the
ten new EU Member States that all have very low corporate taxes has further
accelerated this debate.
In addition, what is becoming more and more common practice is that large
MNEs bargain with countries over the tax rate they will have to pay. The fol-
lowing quote from the Financial Times is a nice illustration of that:
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"Sandoz, a Swiss pharmaceutical multinational has asked 3 countries in Eu-
rope to state what they could o®er in terms of taxes and other bene¯ts. The
2company is currently located in Vienna but is considering a move elsewhere in
Europe in which ¯nancial and tax considerations are crucial as well as closeness
to existing operations and to customers, in addition to access to the best people."
A comparison of Statutory Tax Rates (STR) across countries o®ers only a par-
tial insight in terms of how attractive a particular country is to a MNE in terms
of location. Complementary to the tax rate, also the tax base is an impor-
tant element in the comparison of the tax burden across countries. The extent
of depreciation allowances, interest deductions and other tax allowances that a
country allows, are also important factors in the overall tax burden ¯rms face. A
measure that takes this into account is the so-called E®ective Tax Rate (ETR).
The di®erence between a country's o±cial tax rate (STR) and the E®ective Tax
Rate (ETR) is a re°ection of the amount of tax allowances a country o®ers.
In this paper we start by developing a simple model that illustrates why a coun-
try is inclined to tax MNE ¯rms less than purely domestic ¯rms. The distinctive
feature of multinationals is that they have alternative location options. We use
a simple bargaining framework between a ¯rm and a country A, to show that a
¯rm with an outside option in terms of location will be taxed lower than a ¯rm
that does not have that option.
Next, we engage in an empirical test of that theoretical prediction. We use a
large data set of thousands of company accounts to analyze the di®erence in the
corporate taxation of foreign owned multinationals (MNEs) and domestic ¯rms,
while at the same time controlling for other determinants that may explain the
heterogeneity of ¯rm level e®ective tax rates that we observe in the data.
In the next section we introduce the model. In section 3, we explain how we
measure the E®ective Tax Rate and in section 4 we discuss the empirical model
that we use to test for tax di®erentiation between domestic and multinational
¯rms, controlling for other factors that may explain the large extent of ¯rm level
heterogeneity in the E®ective Tax Rates. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we will develop a simple Nash bargaining model to show how the
government of a particular country responds to outside options of MNE ¯rms
in term of tax treatment.
We assume there is only one ¯rm. When the ¯rm is a multinational it has two
alternative locations. Either it sets up in country A, or it locates in country
B. These locations are symmetric in the sense that set up costs and marginal
production costs are assumed the same unless stated otherwise, therefore in
comparing location A and B they will not a®ect the decision and can be dropped
from the analysis. Whatever location is chosen, the ultimate objective of the
¯rm is to supply a "third market" in country C. The reason why the ¯rm can
3not set up in C could be that wage costs in C are so high that production there
would not be pro¯table. We assume that A and B are equally far away from C,
therefore transport costs to ¯nal consumers in C are the same whether the ¯rm
sets up in A or B and can also be dropped from the analysis. With this simple
model, we will show that a ¯rm that bargains with country A over the tax rate
on its pro¯ts, will obtain a lower tax rate as long as it has a credible outside
location option. By assuming that the relevant market is a "third-market",
we simplify the government objective function of country A since we can drop
the consumer surplus from the objective function. The demand function in the
relevant market C is
P = ® ¡ °Q; (1)
where P is the price and Q is the quantity while ® and ° are both parameters
with ® > °. The production function of the ¯rm is such that one unit of labor
is required for one unit of output
Q = L; (2)
where L is labor, the only input for the production. The pro¯t of the ¯rm before
tax is given by
¼ = PQ ¡ wL; (3)
where w is the wage rate which is the same across country A and B.
The after-tax pro¯t of the ¯rm is
¦ = (PQ ¡ wL)(1 ¡ tA); (4)
where tA is the corporate tax rate in country A and 0 < tA < 1.
To simplify things we assume that the ¯rm is a foreign owned multinational.
Therefore whatever pro¯ts it generates, the after tax pro¯ts will be shifted
abroad and do not enter the welfare function of country A1. We assume that
the welfare function of country A consists of the wage bill from the employment
and the tax income, thus the welfare function is as the following
G = wL + tA¼; (5)
where G stands for the government welfare. Or in terms of the after-tax pro¯t
the government welfare is




Country B is identical to country A except for the corporate tax rate tB which
is not subject to bargaining but is assumed exogenous and can therefore be
treated as a parameter rather than a decision variable. The main reason for
assuming it ¯xed is that we want to abstract from tax competition between
1We can relax this assumption and include the ¯rm's after tax pro¯ts into the welfare
function of A since it would not change our basic result, just make the algebra more compli-
cated. But this suggests that it is not so much the ownership of the MNE that matters, but
predominantly its "footloose" nature.
4countries, which complicates matters somewhat but which is not essential for
the point we want to make namely that when a ¯rm bargains with a country
to get a favorable tax treatment, the footloose nature of the ¯rm in terms of
having an alternative location, will result in a lower equilibrium tax rate than
when the ¯rm is not footloose and can not "threaten" the government to move
away to country B in the case where a deal is not struck with country A over a
suitable tax rate.
The staging of the model is as follows. In the ¯rst stage country A and the ¯rm
bargain over the tax rate tA. Then in the second stage, the MNE ¯rm chooses
its location, depending on where pro¯ts are highest. In the last stage, the ¯rm
chooses its output to supply market C to optimize its after-tax pro¯t. The
equilibrium tax rate is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is obtained
through backward induction.
The equilibrium output from the ¯nal stage is as follows (the variables with star



















(1 ¡ tB): (9)
In the ¯rst stage the Nash bargaining product is given by
­ = (G¤ ¡ G0)¯(¦¤ ¡ ¦0)1¡¯; (10)
where G0 and ¦0 represent the outside options for government A and the ¯rm
respectively. These outside options are what both country A and the ¯rm would
get in case the bargaining is not successful and both parties would walk away
from the bargaining table without an agreement. We assume that if the "deal
is o®", country A ends up with nothing (no wage revenue and no tax revenue
from the ¯rm) or in other words that G0 = 0. The ¯rm's outside option is the
pro¯ts it gets when moving to B. Or, in other words, in (11), we set ¦0 = ¦B.
The parameter ¯ is a parameter representing the bargaining power of country A
while (1 ¡ ¯) is the bargaining strength of the ¯rm. We assume this parameter
to be exogenous and lies between zero and 1. The Nash bargaining product
therefore becomes















5The ¯rst order condition of the Nash bargaining product gives the solution for










Let us now calculate the tax rate country A would set as a result of the bar-
gaining process if the ¯rm would not have an outside option to move to country
B or put di®erently the outside option would be zero (¦0 = 0). In that case the
Nash bargaining product becomes













And the equilibrium tax rate becomes2
e t¤




When we compare the solutions from the two models, we can get
e t¤
A ¡ t¤




This suggests that when the ¯rm has an outside location option, the government
sets a lower tax (or gives higher subsidy). Or, put di®erently when the ¯rm is
a footloose MNE that can threaten the government to locate elsewhere, the tax
rate will be more favorable than for a ¯rm without that alternative option.




= ¯ > 0; (18)
which means the tax rate of country A is complementary to the tax rate of
country B.
2Note that the demand parameter ° drops out in the calculation of the equilibrium tax
rate.
63 How do we measure the E®ective Tax Rate?
Our calculation of the E®ective Tax Rate (ETR) is based on the annual com-
pany accounts that ¯rms publish each year and is often referred to as the average
ETR (Callihan, 1994)3.
The de¯nition of the average e®ective tax rate, common in the literature (i.e.
Callihan (1994); Shackelford and Shevlin (2001); Buijink et al. (2002); Nicodµ eme
(2001); Janssen (2005)) is the ¯rm level ratio of Tax Expenses (T) over pre-tax
Income/Pro¯ts (I).
E®ective Tax Rate (ETRi) =
Tax Expenses (Ti)
Pro¯t Before Tax (Ii)
: (19)
The Tax Expenses (T) are de¯ned as Taxable Income (TI) times the Statutory
Tax Rate (t)
T = TI £ t: (20)
But while we observe Tax Expenses and Pro¯ts Before Tax in our data, we do
not observe Taxable Income. The di®erence between the Pro¯t Before Tax (I)
and the Taxable Income (TI) is referred to as Tax Preferences (TP)4
TPi = Ii ¡ TIi; or TIi = Ii ¡ TPi: (21)
Tax preferences include temporary and permanent di®erences between account-
ing pro¯ts and taxable income. Substituting TIi in (19) leads to a ¯rm level
measure of ETR
ETRi =





) £ t: (22)
The above expression shows how ¯rm level ETRs are a®ected by Tax Prefer-
ences (TP), pre-tax Income/Pro¯t (I) and Tax Rate (t) changes.
It can also be seen that if the tax base or Taxable Income (TI) is equal to
the pre-tax accounting pro¯t, the E®ective Tax Rate (ETR) would equal the
Statutory Tax Rate (t). However, the tax base of a ¯rm can di®er from the pre-
tax accounting pro¯t. The ¯scal authority can for example reject a number of
expenses as non-deductibles which enlarge the tax base or it can exempt certain
revenues from taxation (like dividend income from shareholdings in other ¯rms)
which reduce the tax base. Di®erences in ETR and STR re°ect the extent of
the tax preferences granted to a particular ¯rm. In addition we should also
3An alternative ETR de¯nition is the marginal ETR which is the tax rate to the additional
unit of income from a speci¯c investment project (Devereux et al., 2002). Marginal ETRs are
better suited to investigate the e®ect of taxation on investment decisions. Marginal ETRs
can also be used at the level of the ¯rm as a whole, but of course the ¯rm is a collection of
investment projects, which makes the use of marginal ETRs at that level more problematic.
Average ETRs are better suited to express the overall tax burden on the company because
they express the rate of tax paid on company income.
4Tax preferences are the collective tax incentives provided by a government to ¯rms which
can consist in allowances, investment breaks or special rulings.
7point out that di®erences in STR and ETR may re°ect the level of e±ciency
and frequency of tax audits of the ¯scal authorities. In several countries the tax
audits are usually organized through regional tax o±ces. An earlier paper by
Vandenbussche et al. (2005) has shown that this may result in regional tax com-
petition where the region which is relatively worse o® economically has lower
e±ciency/enforcement than other regions.
4 An Empirical Model to explain the ¯rm level
heterogeneity in E®ective Tax Rates
4.1 Data and Empirical Model
In this section we set out to analyze the determinants of e®ective taxation at
the ¯rm level in Belgium. Or in other words, we look for explanations as to why
e®ective tax rates are so di®erent over time and across ¯rms. But as discussed
above, there are several reasons why an individual ¯rm may end up paying less
than that. During the period of our analysis the o±cial corporate tax rate for
the Belgian ¯rms in our sample was 40.17%5. The average E®ective Tax Rate
during the period of our analysis was much lower than that and in the range of
30%. In this section we want to analyze amongst others whether there is a dif-
ference in e®ective tax rate between foreign owned Multinational (MNE) ¯rms
and domestic ¯rms. For this purpose, we use unconsolidated ¯rm-level data of
non-¯nancial ¯rms6 between 1993 and 2002 from the AMADEUS database of
Bureau van Dijk7.
To address our research question, we collected information on foreign ownership.
In Amadeus we ¯nd 11,724 ¯rms falling into the highest STR (40.17%) pool in
Belgium and 4,388 ¯rms with information on shareholdings. In approximately
17.5% of the ¯rms on which we have information on ownership structure, there
is one majority foreign owner that holds 50% or more of the shares. This cor-
responds to 767 companies, which is somewhat less than 10% of all ¯rms. Our
de¯nition of foreign ownership is a very strict one and di®ers from that used
elsewhere in the literature. Since the focus in this paper is on tax discrimi-
nation between foreign MNEs and other ¯rms, we want to make sure that the
¯rms we single out as foreign owned are the most "footloose". Firms with 1
majority foreign owner that holds more than 50% of all shares is arguably the
most footloose type of ¯rm in our data since the foreign shareholder can easily
"pack up and go" if he/she wants to. In contrast, take for example a ¯rm that
5The statutory tax rate in Belgium follows a progressive system. This implies that smaller
¯rms pay a smaller percentage pro¯t tax than large ¯rms. In our analysis of the E®ective Tax
Rates across ¯rms, we only want to consider ¯rms that fall under the same statutory tax rate.
For that purpose we decided to focus on the largest ¯rms in the highest STR-bracket which
during the period of our analysis was 40.17%.
6We exclude ¯nancial ¯rms in NACE categories 65 to 67 because they are subject to a
separate set of accounting rules and can not simply be compared with manufacturing and
service ¯rms.
7Other recent papers that have used AMADEUS data are Budd et al. (2005), Helpman
et al. (2004), Huizinga and Nicodµ eme (2005).
8has 5 foreign shareholders where each of the shareholders owns 20%. This type
of ¯rm, while a 100% foreign owned ¯rm is somewhat less "footloose" than a
¯rm in which 1 foreign shareholder owns more than 50% of the shares. In the
former case with 5 foreign shareholders, a (re)location decision would require an
agreement between several of the shareholders, which is more di±cult. This is
an important di®erence with the paper by Huizinga and Nicodµ eme (2005) where
foreign ownership is included as a continuous variable, including ¯rms with very
small foreign participations and ¯rms with scattered foreign ownership. In our
opinion, ¯rms with very small foreign participations or scattered foreign owner-
ship are not really footloose and can almost be regarded as domestic ¯rms since
they can not threaten the government to locate elsewhere. While the minority
foreign shareholder can sell whatever shares he/she has in a Belgian ¯rm if not
happy with his/her after tax return on investment, he/she does not have the
majority of votes necessary to decide on (re)location. Recent other theoretical
work by Huizinga and Nielsen (1997, 2000) and Kind et al. (2001), has shown
that when foreign ¯rms have a ¯xed location (are not allowed to move in the
model), the government has an incentive to put a higher tax on the foreign ¯rms
compared to the domestic ¯rms. Increased foreign ownership in a model with
exogenous location, provides countries with an incentive to increase corporate
tax levels, as it introduces the possibility of tax exportation. When domestic
rents accrue to foreign residents, a country has a large incentive to tax them
through the corporate tax system. This is also what Huizinga and Nicodµ eme
(2005) ¯nd empirically. However, the focus in this paper lies on the "footloose"
nature of a ¯rm. Both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view we
¯nd the opposite, namely that footloose MNEs pay less taxes than other ¯rms.
Here we should point out that the shareholder information is only available for
the year 2002 and we assume it to hold during the entire period of our sample
between 1993-2002.
In Table 1 we give a short overview of the characteristics of our dataset in terms
of number of ¯rms, average of employment by ¯rms as well as average sales
and average total assets. We report the data for the foreign owned ¯rms and
domestic ¯rms in separate columns. We note that the foreign ¯rms are on aver-
age larger both in terms of employment, sales and in terms of total assets than
Belgian ¯rms.
The empirical model explaining the heterogeneity of ¯rm level ETRs is speci-
¯ed below in (23). The dependent variable on the left hand side captures the
E®ective Tax Rate (ETR) as de¯ned in (19). It is worth pointing out here that
our dependent variable controls implicitly for transfer pricing e®ects. To see
that our empirical results are not driven by transfer pricing practices, consider
the following numerical example. Suppose a MNE instead of 100$ pro¯ts before
tax, reports 150$ as a result of transfer pricing considerations. Suppose further
that the STR in the country in which the MNE reports additional pro¯t equals
20%. In principle, this would imply that the ¯rm instead of 20$ taxes in the
absence of transfer pricing, now pays 30$ taxes. However, in both cases the
ETR would be the same and equal 20%. Hence, transfer pricing a®ects numer-
ator and denominator of the ETR ratio in a proportional way, suggesting that
transfer pricing is not what we pick up.
9On the right hand side of (23) we include a number of variables that may explain
the heterogeneity in ETRs. In our empirical model we include a dummy variable
FOREIGN that takes the value of 1 when the ¯rm is majority foreign owned by
one foreign shareholder and takes a value of 0 when there is no majority foreign
shareholder and a number of other control variables summarized in vector Z:
ETRit = ¯0 + ¯1FOREIGNi + ¯2Zi + "it; (23)
where subscript i is a ¯rm level subscript and t refers to the time period.
An overview of the control variables in Z is given in Table 2 and we will dis-
cuss each of them brie°y below. In order to control for the fact that foreign
owned ¯rms tend to be bigger than other ¯rms, we include a measure of ¯rm
size (FIRMSIZE). We measure the variable FIRMSIZE by the "Number of Em-
ployees" of a company. We ¯nd a positive e®ect of FIRMSIZE on the ETR, or
in other words that larger ¯rms get fewer tax preferences and pay more taxes.
Hence, the Belgian tax system is not entirely neutral with respect to this ¯rm
characteristic. One potential explanation put forward by Zimmerman (1983)
is that large ¯rms have more political visibility and are scrutinized more than
smaller ¯rms, making them pay more taxes than smaller ¯rms.
In addition we also control for a number of other ¯rm characteristics. First of
all we include a series of variables that legally result in deductibles that lower
the tax base (LEGAL) such as the capital intensity, which we de¯ne as the
ratio of "Fixed Tangible Assets" over "Total Assets". When ¯rms invest in
capital (buildings, machinery and equipment etc.) they have depreciation al-
lowances. The same holds for investment in "Intangible Fixed Assets" which
we take as a proxy for the ¯rms' expenditures on R&D which also result in de-
preciation allowances. When the government makes R&D attractive in terms of
the depreciation allowances, it helps private initiative and overcomes "free rid-
ing" problems and other issues which normally result in an under-investment in
R&D when left to the market. Through the tax system governments can provide
incentives for ¯rms to engage in more R&D than they otherwise would under-
take, which is likely to yield a better outcome in terms of social welfare. Other
¯rm characteristics resulting in legal allowance are listed in Table 2 under "LE-
GAL" and in addition also include "Long-term Debt" and "Short-term Debt"
since interests are usually considered as expenses that lower the reported pro¯ts
and the tax base. Besides those, CF, a dummy variable standing for "Carry-
forward" is included to control for the tax treatment to loss in the previous year.
To control for the evolution of the E®ective Tax Rate over time, we also include
YEAR dummies in the empirical model (the year 1993 is our benchmark and
will be dropped in the analysis).
As a last control variable we also include the SECTOR to which a ¯rm be-
longs. We specify a sector at the 2-digit NACE industrial classi¯cation. The
data at our disposal includes about 57, 2-digit NACE sectors in agriculture,
manufacturing and services. While the sectors will be included as controls in
10the empirical model, for brevity, we will not report them separately.
Nevertheless to give an idea of sectoral heterogeneity, we show in Figure 1 the
average ETR per sector. We can see that taxes are higher in some sectors
than in others. The vertical line indicates the overall average for all sectors.
In some sectors the ETR is clearly higher than the overall average like in the
"construction sector", the "production of furniture and jewelry", the "wholesale
and retail" and the "tanning and dressing of leather". Other sectors have below
average ETRs, such as the "supplies of gas, water and electricity" (utility), the
"real estate activities" sector and the "hotels and restaurants" sector.
The complete empirical model that we estimate then becomes:
ETRit =¯0 + ¯1FOREIGNi + ¯2FIRMSIZEit + ¯3LEGALit
+¯4Y EARi + ¯5SECTORi + "it:
(24)
4.2 Results of the Empirical Model
The results of estimating (24) are shown in Table 3. To check for robustness,
we show several regression speci¯cations in Table 3. The use of a ¯xed-e®ects
regression is preferable whenever using ¯rm-level data. The disadvantage of
using ¯xed e®ects is however that the combination of ¯xed e®ects and other
time-invariant variables, such as our ownership dummy (FOREIGN) is not pos-
sible. Since the ownership information that we have does not vary over time
but are speci¯c for each ¯rm, they would be dropped out with a ¯xed e®ects
speci¯cation.
Instead we use a set of other speci¯cations. In column (1) we show the result of
an OLS speci¯cation with both Robust White corrected standard errors, which
controls for possible heteroskedasticity of the observations, and clusters where
we consider each ¯rm as a separate cluster. The reason for the clustered re-
gression is that the observations of one ¯rm over time can be correlated. Since
observations over time from the same ¯rm are not necessarily independent of
each other, we consider each ¯rm as a separate "cluster" in the regression. In
columns (2), we use a "censored tobit regression" that takes into account the
censoring we applied on our dependent variable. We truncated the observations
for each ¯rm's ETR by keeping only values lying between 0 and 1 (like in Collins
and Shackelford (1995)). In Figure 2 we illustrate the total distribution of non-
truncated ETRs in the dataset. Here we can see a number of observations lying
below 0 or above 1. ETRs below 0 can re°ect losses instead of pro¯ts in the
denominator. To avoid this, we only incorporate the observations with positive
pro¯ts in our dataset. ETRs above 1 can be the result of tax ¯nes that a ¯rm
must pay with respect to pro¯ts of previous years. We also disregard those ob-
servations. However these truncations on the dependent variable could bias our
empirical estimates. Hence in column (2) we report the results using the cen-
sored tobit regression. In column (3) of Table 3 we estimate a dynamic model.
11This implies that we include an extra explanatory variable namely the lagged
ETR. In order to control for potential ¯rst order serial correlation, we prefer to
lag the ETR by two periods (ETR 2). The variable has high positive signi¯-
cance in the model suggesting it is important to be included. In the dynamic
speci¯cation, we no longer take year dummies on board as control variables,
since arguably the lagged value controls for the evolution of ETRs over time.
Finally in column (4a) and (4b) we want to control for the so-called "self-
selection" problem. It is possible that foreign shareholders only invest in com-
panies with low ETRs. If this form of "cherry picking" is going on, this would
give rise to an econometric problem of endogeneity. Or, put di®erently foreign
ownership would become a function of ETR. To control for this potential en-
dogeneity problem, we apply a correction to the estimation procedure known
as the "treatment e®ects" (similar to Heckman's two-step estimation) (Greene,
2000). The ¯rst step of this two-step estimation consists in estimating a probit
equation to obtain the probability of being foreign owned. This results in a haz-
ard rate (also referred to as the Inverse Mills Ratio) that is included as an extra
regressor in the second stage regression to obtain an unbiased estimate for the
FOREIGN dummy. For the remainder this second step regression is the same
as described in (24). The ¯rst step probit equation we used is the following:
FOREIGNi =°0 + °1FIRMSIZEit + °2LEGALit
+ °3SECTORi + °4PRODUCTIVit + ¹it:
(25)
Typically in a "treatment e®ects" approach, the ¯rst step right hand side vari-
ables are partly the same as in the model for ETR. However for identi¯cation
purposes at least one extra variable is needed in the ¯rst step "selection equa-
tion". Recent theoretical literature has shown that foreign owned MNE ¯rms
are the more productive ¯rms (Helpman et al., 2004) and there is empirical
evidence in support of that (Gri±th, 1999). Therefore we feel it is reasonable to
include labor productivity (PRODUCTIV) as an extra variable in the selection
equation8. We measure labor productivity as "value added per worker". This
value is further normalized by the mean across ¯rms within the relevant 2-digit
Nace industry in that year. This normalization means that we do not need
to measure Producer Price Indices, which is notoriously di±cult to obtain in
service and other industries except for manufacture industry9 (Gri±th et al.,
2004). The results of this ¯rst step are reported in Table 3 in column (4b). In
column (4a) we report the coe±cients of the step 2 estimation where the inverse
mills ratio (based on the step 1 equation) is included as an extra regressor. The
coe±cient on the inverse mills ratio that is reported at the bottom of column
(4a) is positive and signi¯cant suggesting that there is a selection issue. This
suggests that in an OLS regression without correction for selection, the coe±-
cient is biased upward (Greene (2000), p759). Or in other words is estimated
8We experimented also with other control variables like Return on Assets and Return on
Equity. The choice for the extra variable doesn't make a di®erence for the coe±cient of our
key variable foreign ownership dummy.
9We have also regressed a subset for only manufacture sectors (with 2-digit NACE between
10 and 41) with real labor productivity, which means the labor productivity has been de°ated
by Producer Price Index. The main results are similar to those for the non-de°ated total set.
12larger than its true value. Indeed when we compare the coe±cient on the for-
eign dummy in column (4a) we see that it is smaller (more negative) than the
one we obtained under OLS in column (1). In our case it means that the tax
discrimination of foreign ¯rms is larger than what the OLS estimates suggested.
For completeness we give a short overview of the two-step Heckman procedure
in the appendix.
A general observation that arises from Table 3 is that our results remain quite
stable across the di®erent estimation methods. In each of the speci¯cations
where we included the variable FOREIGN it always has a negative sign and is
very signi¯cant. When we do not check for self-selection, the coe±cient of the
variable FOREIGN varies between -0.014 and -0.040, which implies that the
ETRs of foreign ¯rms lie on average between 1.4% and 4% lower than those for
domestic ¯rms. Since the average ETR for the whole dataset is around 30%, we
can say that the average ETR for the foreign ¯rms lies approximately between
26% and 28.6%. In other words, the e®ective tax rate for foreign companies is
approximately 9% lower than the average ([0.014+0.04)/2]/0.30).
However, when we consider the possibility that foreign shareholders "select"
themselves into ¯rms with low ETR, that is when we check for "self-selection",
the coe±cient goes to a value of -0.221. This suggests that when we control
for self-selection the tax di®erence between foreign owned multinationals and
domestic ¯rms is even larger. Controlling for self-selection means that foreign
multinationals have a tax burden of approximately 22.1% points lower relative
to the average, or suggests that foreign owned ¯rms have an average ETR of
about 7.9% (30%-22.1%). This is approximately 73.7% lower than what Belgian
¯rms (0.221/0.30) pay in terms of average ETR.
Regarding the other control variables, all speci¯cations more or less give the
same results. The FIRMSIZE variable has a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient.
In Belgium, larger ¯rms seem to pay more taxes. In other words the tax system
in Belgium is unfriendly for employment. The R&D Intensity variable and the
Capital Intensity variable are negative and signi¯cant for Belgium. The esti-
mate of labor productivity in the ¯rst stage of the treatment e®ects regression
is positive and signi¯cant which indicates that the MNE ¯rms are also more
productive than domestic ¯rms in Belgium as what is found in UK by Gri±th
(1999).
When we look at the YEAR dummies, we see that the e®ective tax burden has
increased over time for Belgian ¯rms, especially in the period 1999-2002, which
was the period just prior the tax reform the Belgian government introduced in
2002. The main element in the tax reform was that the Statutory Tax Rate was
lowered from 40.17% to 33.99%. This seems to suggest that the tax base was
widened in the years that directly before the tax reform. This phenomenon of
enlarged tax bases coinciding with decreasing tax rates has also been observed in
other European countries. Most EU countries that are also in the EURO-zone,
are con¯ned by the Maastricht budget criteria and have an incentive to make
sure that any reduction in the o±cial tax rate is budget neutral. The only way
13this can be achieved is through widening the tax base, which is apparently also
true for the Belgian case.
The results in Table 3 also suggest that debt ¯nancing always seems to reduce
the E®ective Tax Rate. This seems to con¯rm the notion that equity ¯nancing
is disadvantaged which may explain why the Belgian government in 2005 is
considering to implement a tax deduction for equity ¯nancing10.
4.3 Discussion of results
The empirical section above con¯rmed our theoretical model in section 2. Based
on ¯rm level data for Belgium, we ¯nd that the government tax discriminates
between ¯rms in favor of footloose multinationals. These results are also in line
with a recent theory paper by Hau°er and Wooton (1999). That paper shows
that a "small" country has an incentive to give more tax breaks to a footloose
¯rm than a large country. The reason is that an MNE prefers to be in the large
country to save on transport costs when serving its consumers. Therefore a
large country has far less of an incentive to provide tax cuts to multinationals,
whereas a small country in order to attract a multinational will have to overcome
the fact that it is smaller and it can do so by o®ering the multinational a more
favorable treatment compared to the large country. The tax rate in equilibrium
o®ered by the small country will be low enough for the multinational to over-
come the additional transport costs it will face when supplying its customers in
the large country from a distance.
The tax discrimination we ¯nd between footloose MNEs and other ¯rms is not
driven by transfer pricing. The dependent variable in our regression is the Ef-
fective Tax Rate (ETR) de¯ned as the ratio of "Tax Expenses/Pro¯ts Before
Tax". With a numerical example it is easy to show that both in the absence or
the presence of transfer prices, the ETR is the same. The reason is that transfer
pricing a®ects numerator and denominator of the ETR ratio in a proportional
way. If a ¯rm decides to report more pro¯ts before tax in one country for
transfer pricing reasons, it will proportionally pay more taxes in the reporting
country. While this could be of interest to the ¯rm since this may minimize its
global tax bill especially when the tax rate in the country it decides to report
more pro¯ts is a low tax rate, it does not interfere with the question we want
to analyze in this paper, namely whether foreign owned MNEs pay less taxes
than domestic ¯rms. This implies that our results are not driven by transfer
pricing issues. Other de¯nitions of ETR sometimes used in the literature are
more prone to transfer pricing issues. For example in when ETR is de¯ned
as "Tax Expenses/Total Assets" as in Huizinga and Nicodµ eme (2005). In this
de¯nition of ETR, the numerator is a®ected through transfer pricing, while the
denominator is not. "Total Assets" in the denominator of the ETR variable can
not eliminate the in°uence of transfer pricing on the tax burden of MNE ¯rms
who have opportunities to shift pro¯ts (but not assets).
10PwC Tax Newsletter, April 2005, "Introduction of the Concept of 'Notional Interest De-
duction' into Belgian Tax Law".
145 Conclusion
This paper aims to contribute to the debate in the corporate taxation literature
on the e®ect of increased economic integration and mobility of ¯rms on corpo-
rate tax rates. Using a simple theoretical framework we show that governments
are inclined to tax "footloose" ¯rms less than other ¯rms.
Empirically we proxy the footloose nature of ¯rms by identifying in our data all
majority foreign owned multinational ¯rms in Belgium; that is we identify all
¯rms that have one foreign owner that holds more than 50% of all shares.
Our empirical evidence, based on ¯rm level data in a small open economy Bel-
gium, con¯rms that there is substantial tax discrimination in favor of "footloose"
MNE ¯rms. The tax discrimination e®ects are largest when we control for self-
selection of foreign ¯rms into low e®ective tax ¯rms by means of a "treatment
e®ects" approach.
We should point out that the ownership information in our data is time in-
variant, therefore our results are mainly obtained through the cross-sectional
variation in ownership across ¯rms. Our results are robust across a range of
alternative estimation techniques.
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17Table 1: Summary statistics of Belgian ¯rms and foreign owned ¯rms
Foreign-owned ¯rms Domestic ¯rms
Number of Firms 767 3,621
Average Employment 164.62 65.67
(543.82) (280.23)
Average Sales (Th. Euro) 64,415.93 26,231.13
(249,108.9) (102,075.6)
Average Total Assets (Th. Euro) 93,943.85 34,077.03
(589,702.7) (196,044.8)
Source: Amadeus, Bureau Van Dijk
Note: standard deviations between brackets
Table 2: Variables in the model of E®ective Tax Rates (ETR)
Variables Descriptions
FOREIGN A dummy variable which takes value 1 for a ¯rm i with at
least 50% shares in the hands of a foreign shareholder and
value 0 if there is no foreign majority shareholder.
FIRMSIZE The size of a company measured by the natural logarithm of
the number of employees.
LEGAL
LTLEVERAGE =Long-term debt/total assets
STLEVERAGE =Short-term debt/total assets
CAPITALINTENS =Tangible ¯xed assets/total assets
R&D INTENS =Intangible ¯xed assets/total assets
CF(carry-forward) A dummy variable which takes value 1 when ¯rm i made
losses in the previous year and value 0 if pro¯t achieved
instead.
YEAR Dummy variables which are made for each year between 1993
and 2002. The year 1993 is taken as a benchmark so that the
dummy for 1993 is left from the model.
SECTOR 57 dummy variables based on 2-digit NACE and 1 sectors left
as benchmark.
PRODUCTIV Value added per worker. We normalize the labor productivity
with the mean across the industry in terms of 2-digit NACE
code in that year.
ETR 2 2 periods lagged variable for ETR.
18Figure 1: Average ETR by sector
19Table 3: Estimates of the regression analysis for the model of the E®ective Tax
Rate
ETRit =¯0 + ¯1FOREIGNi + ¯2FIRMSIZEit + ¯3LEGALit
+¯4Y EARi + ¯5SECTORi + "it:
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b)
Robust Censored Dynamic Treatment Treatment
Clustered Tobit Model E®ects E®ects
Regression Regression Model Model
(2nd stage) (1st stage)
FOREIGN -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.014*** -0.221*** -
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.034)
FIRMSIZE 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.028*** 0.271***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010)
CAPITALINTENS -0.069*** -0.074*** -0.009 -0.093*** -0.762***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.070)
R&D INTENS -0.107*** -0.161*** 0.004 -0.094*** -0.072
(0.043) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.234)
LTLEVERAGE -0.068** -0.187*** -0.028*** -0.112*** 0.075
(0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.065)
STLEVERAGE -0.187*** -0.262*** -0.100*** -0.188*** 0.136*
(0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.078)
CF -0.228*** -0.352*** -0.174*** -0.232*** -
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
PRODUCTIV - - - - 0.046***
(0.008)
ETR 2 - - 0.406*** - -
(0.010)
1994 0.041*** 0.051*** - 0.048*** -
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
1995 0.037*** 0.046*** - 0.036*** -
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
1996 0.044*** 0.055*** - 0.044*** -
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
1997 0.045*** 0.055*** - 0.045*** -
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
1998 0.040*** 0.050*** - 0.040*** -
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
1999 0.052*** 0.066*** - 0.056*** -
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
2000 0.048*** 0.062*** - 0.053*** -
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
2001 0.052*** 0.065*** - 0.058*** -
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
2002 0.043*** 0.055*** - 0.053*** -
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
SECTOR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CONSTANT 0.224*** 0.179*** 0.155*** 0.195*** -7.186
(0.039) (0.023) (0.027) (0.037) (0.408)
LAMBDA - - - 0.114*** -
(0.020)
No. of Observations 25,222 25,222 19,223 15,997 15,997
20Figure 2: Distribution of ETRs
A Appendix: a two-step Heckman estimation
The primary interest is in the regression function:
ETRit = Xit¯ + ±fowni + "it; (26)
where fowni is an endogenous dummy variable indicating whether the treat-
ment is assigned or not. The binary decision to obtain the treatment fowni is
modeled as the outcome of an unobserved latent variable, fown¤
i. It is assumed
that fown¤
i is a linear function of a set of exogenous variables (Wit), which
can be the same as Xit in ( 26) but at least one extra variable is needed for
identi¯cation, and a random component ¹j. Speci¯cally,
fown¤
it = Wit° + ¹it; (27)







The probit estimates of the treatment equation ( 27) is obtained by maximum
likelihood in the ¯rst stage, as
21Pr(fowni = 1 j Wit) = ©(Wit°): (29)
From these estimates, the hazard rate, hi, for each observation is computed as
hi =
(
Á(Wit^ °)=©(Wit^ °); fowni = 1
¡Á(Wit^ °)=f1 ¡ ©(Wit^ °)g; fowni = 0:
(30)
where Á is the standard normal density, and © is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. In the second stage, the two-step parameter estimates of
¯ and ± are obtained by augmenting the regression equation with the hazard
(inverse mills ratio) h. Then,
E(ETRit j fowni) = Xit¯ + ±fownit + ¯hhj (31)
And we obtain the additional coe±cient ¯h on the variable containing the haz-
ard. When ¯h is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero there exists a self-selection
problem and including the hazard rate (inverse mills ratio) in step 2 will correct
for it. From estimating ( 31) the coe±cient ± on fown will now be correctly
estimated.
22